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Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers:
The Constitutionality of Conditions on Public
Benefits in California
Federal, state, and local governments provide many public bene-
fits, including employment opportunities, welfare, unemployment com-
pensation, university education, and the use of public facilities.' While
a government necessarily must restrict access to the benefits it bestows,
the manner in which it does so is constitutionally limited.2 Thus, re-
strictions that require potential recipients to waive constitutional rights
to qualify for benefits raise serious constitutional questions.3 These
types of restrictions, which countermand constitutional safeguards,
have been called "unconstitutional conditions."
4
In Harris v. McRae,5 the United States Supreme Court demon-
strated that not all conditions affecting the constitutional rights of pub-
lic benefit recipients are invalid.6 Finding that restrictions on federal
abortion funding7 did not directly impinge on a woman's constitution-
1. See O'Neil, Unconstitutional Conditions. Wefare Benefts WiCth Strings Attached, 54
CALIF. L. Rnv. 443, 446.48 (1966) [hereinafter cited as O'Neil]; Note, Unconstitutional Con-
ditions, 73 HARV. L. Rav. 1595, 1596 (1960).
2. Restrictions on benefits may not be arbitrary or discriminatory, Wieman v. Upde-
graf, 344 U.S. 183, 191-92 (1952), and must be reasonably related to a legitimate govern-
mental interest. United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 533 (1973).
3. See, e.g., Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971) (plaintiff alleged that denial of
welfare benefits upon recipient's refusal to allow home visit threatened fourth amendment
rights; Court upheld denial of benefits because such a visit not a "search"); Sherbert v. Ver-
ner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (plaintiffs refusal to work on Saturdays because of religious beliefs
prompted state's denial of unemployment benefits; Court held that such indirect coercion
violated first amendment); see also Note, The Resurrection fthe Right-Pri&lege Distinction?
A Critical Look at Maher v. Roe and Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 7 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 165,
167-68 & n.7 (1979).
4. The subject of unconstitutional conditions has been widely discussed. See, e.g.,
O'Neil, sufpra note I; Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Rf'ght-Privilege Distinction in Constitu-
tionalLaw, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1439 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Van Alstyne]; Westen, In-
credible Dilemmas: Conditioning One Constitutional Right on the Forfeiture ofAnother, 66
IOWA L. Rv. 741 (1981); Comment, Another Look at Unconstitutional Conditions, 117 U.
PA. L. REv. 144 (1968); Note, Unconstitutional Conditions, 73 HARe. L. Rnv. 1595 (1960).
5. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
6. See also United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413
U.S. 548 (1973) (upholding § 9(a) of the Hatch Act, 5 U.S.C. § 7324(a)(2) (1976), prohibiting
federal employees from participating in political activities).
7. The restrictions were imposed by the Hyde Amendment, Pub. L. No. 94-439, § 209,
90 Stat. 1418, 1434 (1976); Pub. L. No. 95-205, § 101, 91 Stat. 1460, 1460 (1977); Pub. L. No.
95480, § 210, 92 Stat. 1567, 1586 (1978); Pub. L. No. 96-123, § 109, 93 Stat. 923, 926 (1979).
See notes 82-85 & accompanying text infra.
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ally protected freedom to terminate her pregnancy,8 the Court upheld
the restrictions because they bore a rational relationship to the govern-
ment's legitimate interest in protecting the potential life of the fetus.9
In Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights -v. Myers,'0 the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court, however, struck down provisions of the 1978,
1979, and 1980 California Budget Acts" that similarly restricted abor-
tion funding' 2 obtainable through the state Medi-Cal program.' 3 The
provisions in the Budget Acts at issue in Myers required Medi-Cal can-
didates to forego their constitutional right to have an abortion in order
to qualify for pregnancy-related medical benefits.14 Rejecting the rea-
soning of Harris v. McRae, the California Supreme Court decided My-
ers on independent state grounds.'
5
The Myers court asserted that "a discriminatory or restricted gov-
ernment benefit program demands special scrutiny,"' 16 and evaluated
the Budget Acts under the test it had articulated in Bagley v. Washing-
8. 448 U.S. at 315. Constitutional protection for the woman's right to choose abortion
in the first trimester of pregnancy was recognized in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
9. 448 U.S. at 324-26.
10. 29 Cal. 3d 252, 625 P.2d 779, 172 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1981).
11. 1978 Budget Act, ch. 359, 1978 Cal. Stat. 755; 1979 Budget Act, ch. 259, 1979 Cal.
Stat. 576; 1980 Budget Act, ch. 510, 1980 Cal. Stat. 1069.
12. The provisions of the 1978, 1979, and 1980 Budget Acts limited Medi-Cal funding
for abortions to the following situations: (1) when pregnancy would endanger the mother's
life; (2) when pregnancy would cause severe and long-lasting physical health damage to the
mother, as determined by two physicians, one of whom is a specialist; (3) when pregnancy
results from rape or incest, provided such rape or incest is reported to a law-enforcement
agency; or (4) when prenatal studies (amniocentesis, fetal blood sampling, fetal antiography,
ultrasound, x-ray or maternal blood examination) show that the mother is likely to give
birth to a severely defective child. See 1978 Budget Act, ch. 359, § 2, item 248, 1978 Cal.
Stat. 755, 823-25; 1979 Budget Act, ch. 259, § 2, item 261.5, 1979 Cal. Stat. 576, 644-45; 1980
Budget Act, ch. 510, § 2, item 287.5, 1980 Cal. Stat. 1069, 1146-47.
13. The California Medi-Cal program was designed to provide health care for the aged
and other recipients of public assistance "in the same manner employed by the public gener-
ally, and without discrimination or segregation based purely on economic disability." CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE § 14000 (West 1950). The program funds a wide spectrum of health
care services, including inpatient hospital expenses, outpatient physician, hospital or clinic
services, and family planning services. Id § 14132(a), (b), (o) (West Supp. 1981); see also id
§ 14503 (West Supp. 1981) (outlining eligibility requirements for, and scope of, family plan-
ning services).
14. 29 Cal. 3d 252, 256, 625 P.2d 779, 780, 172 Cal. Rptr. 866, 867 (1981).
15. Id at 257, 625 P.2d at 781, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 868. The court analyzed the validity of
the Budget Acts under the California Constitution, reaffirming its ultimate responsibility to
interpret provisions of the state constitution. "'[W]e cannot properly relegate our task to the
judicial guardians of the federal Constitution, but instead must recognize our personal obli-
gation to exercise independent legal judgment in ascertaining the meaning and application
of state constitutional provisions.'" Id at 262, 625 P.2d at 784, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 871 (quot-
ing People v. Chavez, 26 Cal. 3d 334, 352, 605 P.2d 401, 412, 161 Cal. Rptr. 762, 773 (1980))
(footnote omitted).
16. Id at 257, 625 P.2d at 781, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 868.
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ton Townshio Hospital District.17 This test requires the government to
justify statutory schemes that condition the receipt of benefits upon a
recipient's waiver of a constitutional right. The government must es-
tablish that the imposed condition is reasonable, that it is more benefi-
cial to the public than it is harmful to individual rights, and that the
statute is narrowly drawn, restricting the exercise of constitutional
rights only to the extent necessary to achieve the government's
purpose.18
Conditions on public benefit programs arise in a variety of con-
texts and impinge to varying degrees upon the constitutional rights of
large segments of society. 19 These restrictions affect not only public
employees20 and welfare recipients, 21 who depend on the government
for their livelihood, but also those who occasionally use public services
such as universities22 or permit programs.3 In federal courts, the judi-
cial treatment of such conditions has been inconsistent, resulting in
confusing precedent.24
This Comment discusses the problem of determining the constitu-
tionality of conditions placed on public benefit programs. It first exam-
ines the analysis of these conditions under the United States
Constitution and then reviews the development of the Bagley test in
California law, discussing its application in Committee to DefendRepro-
17. 65 Cal. 2d 499, 421 P.2d 409, 55 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1967).
18. Id at 505-07, 421 P.2d at 414-15, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 406-07.
19. See, e.g., Bagley v. Washington Township Hosp. Dist., 65 Cal. 2d 499, 421 P.2d
409, 55 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1966) (statute restricting political activities of public employees found
unconstitutional). In Bagley, the court noted that "the expansion of government enterprise
with its ever-increasing number of employees marks this area of the law a crucial one. As
the number of persons employed by government and governmentally assisted institutions
continues to grow, the necessity of preserving for them the maximum practicable right to
participate in the political life of the republic grows with it." Id at 510, 421 P.2d at 417, 55
Cal. Rptr. at 409; see also Van Alstyne, supra note 4, at 1482 (contending that because of the
government's expansion into, and attendant influence over, employment, housing, educa-
tion, and welfare, its potential control over an individual's personal life is practically
absolute).
20. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S.
548 (1973).
21. Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
22. Hamilton v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 293 U.S. 245 (1934).
23. Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442 (1954).
24. Compare Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (requirement that individual
report child support status before being issued license for second marriage ruled unconstitu-
tional) with Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47 (1977) (termination of Social Security benefits
upon marriage to nonrecipient upheld). See also Abrams, Systematic Coercion: Unconstitu-
tional Conditions in Criminal Law, 72 J. Cumr. L. & CRIMINOLorY 128, 132 (1981) ("To
date, the Court has not formulated or consistently applied a coherent theory of unconstitu-
tional condition analysis. This inability to articulate the boundaries of a reasonable condi-
tion... has left the lower courts to reconcile inconsistent holdings and produced myriad
rationales and resolutions.").
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ductive Rights v. Myers. Finally, the Comment compares the Bagley
test to the compelling interest and rational relation standards used by
federal courts analyzing conditioned benefit programs. This Comment
concludes that the Bagley test, which includes a balancing process, is a
more flexible and therefore more adequate test for determining the va-
lidity of restrictions that condition receipt of benefits on the waiver of
constitutional rights.
The Federal Approach to Conditions on Public Benefits
The Right-Privilege Distinction
Prior to 1950, courts presumed that conditions on public benefits
were valid because the state's ultimate power to withhold benefits in-
cluded the lesser power to place conditions on them.25 In 1892, Justice
Holmes, writing for the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, set
forth this position in McAuloife v. Mayor of New Bedford.26 Dismissing
the petition of an ex-policeman who had been fired for disobeying a
department prohibition of employee participation in political activities,
Justice Holmes stated: "The petitioner may have a constitutional right
to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman.
27
This statement reveals the fundamental distinction between consti-
tutionally protected rights, such as free speech, and governmentally be-
stowed privileges, such as employment. The latter, Justice Holmes
reasoned, were subject to complete government control; the govern-
ment could freely grant, withdraw, or restrict benefits. If the individual
accepted the benefits, he or she also accepted the loss of constitutional
rights.2
8
Justice Holmes's right-privilege distinction guided judicial analysis
of conditions placed on public benefits until the mid-1950's; federal
courts upheld these conditions almost automatically.29 In Adler v.
Board of Education,30 for example, the Court upheld a New York law
25. See, e.g., Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43, 48 (1897): "The right to absolutely
exclude all right to use necessarily includes the authority to determine under what circum-
stances such use may be availed of, as the greater power contains the lesser."
26. 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892).
27. Id at 220, 29 N.E. at 517.
28. See id at 220, 29 N.E. at 517-18: "There are few employments for hire in which the
servant does not agree to suspend his constitutional rights of free speech as well as of idle-
ness, by the implied terms of his contract."
29. See, e.g., Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952) (statute authorizing dismis-
sal of teacher for membership in subversive organization upheld); Hamilton v. Regents of
Univ. of Cal., 293 U.S. 245 (1934) (military science course requirement at public university
held not to violate free exercise clause); Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950),
affd by an equaly divided court, 341 U.S. 918 (1951) (statute authorizing dismissal of civil
servant based on "reasonable grounds for belief of disloyalty" upheld).
30. 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
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that made membership in subversive organizations grounds for per-
emptory dismissal from public school employment. Embracing Justice
Holmes's argument, the Court stressed that, although school employees
had the right to assemble, speak, and think freely, the local school sys-
tem's control of the terms of employment permitted local governments
to force a choice between membership in subversive organizations and
public school employment.3 1
Erosion of the Right-Privilege Distinction
Soon afterAdler, the Supreme Court began to strike down benefit
restrictions that impinged on a recipient's free exercise of constitutional
rights.32 In Sherbert v. Verner,33 the Court evaluated the validity of a
restriction on South Carolina's unemployment compensation scheme
that disqualified recipients who were available for work but who, with-
out "good cause," refused to accept suitable work.
34
In Sherbert, the plaintiff refused suitable employment because her
religious practices forbade her to work Saturdays, as would have been
required by the employment offered. The Employment Security Com-
mission found that the plaintiffs refusal of work was without good
cause and that she was ineligible for benefits.
35
The plaintiff in Sherbert raised two constitutional objections to the
Commissioner's decision. First, she argued that the decision impermis-
sibly burdened her first amendment right to the free exercise of her
religion because it forced a choice between receipt of benefits and ad-
herence to her religious practices.36 Second, she argued that the deci-
sion made an impermissible distinction between recipients who were
available to work Saturdays and those who were not, because it im-
pinged on the fundamental right to practice a religion that observed the
Sabbath on Saturday.37
Under the reasoning of Adler, South Carolina could have required
unemployment recipients to choose between receiving benefits and fol-
lowing religious practices.38 As no criminal sanctions compelled plain-
tiff to work a six-day week, she was free to refuse unemployment
compensation and retain her religious beliefs. The Sherbert Court,
however, recognized that a forced choice of receiving benefits or of ob-
31. Id at 492-93.
32. See, e.g., Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398 (1963); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513
(1958).
33. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
34. Id at 400-01 & n.3.
35. Id at 401.
36. Id at 404.
37. Id at 410.
38. See Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. at 492-93.
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serving religious precepts put the same kind of burden on the free exer-
cise of religion as would a criminal penalty imposed on Saturday
worship.39 The Court eschewed the right-privilege distinction, finding
that it was "too late in the day to doubt that the liberties of religion and
expression may be infringed by the denial of or placing of conditions
upon a benefit or privilege."'4 Thus, in Sherbert the Court created an
exception to Justice Holmes's principle that governmentally bestowed
benefits may be conditioned on the waiver of constitutional rights. The
Court concluded that, absent a compelling state interest, the state could
not impose conditions on benefits that indirectly deterred express con-




Because the Sherbert Court invalidated the South Carolina regula-
tions as a direct infringement on first amendment rights, it did not con-
sider the equal protection arguments raised by the plaintiff.
42
Nonetheless, the equal protection clause,43 which also limits the types
of conditions the government may place on public benefits,44 could
have provided another basis for the Court's decision in Sherbert.
Generally, a statutory classification will be upheld under the equal
protection clause if the classification bears a rational relation to a legiti-
mate legislative purpose.4 5 If the statutory classification either im-
pinges on the exercise of a fundamental right46 or involves a suspect
39. 374 U.S. at 404. Criminal penalties imposed on the exercise of religion as such and
discriminatory regulations directed at groups whose religious views are abhorrent to the
authorities contravene the free exercise clause of the first amendment. Fowler v. Rhode
Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1952); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 305 (1940).
40. 374 U.S. at 404.
41. Id at 405. Professor Van Alstyne calls this principle the doctrine of unconstitu-
tional conditions and explains its scope. "As an 'exception' to the right-privilege distinction,
the doctrine seems to be a very broad one which is subject only to one major limitation: the
petitioner must demonstrate that the condition of which he complains is unreasonable in the
special sense that it prohibits or abridges the exercise of a right protected by an explicit
provision in the Constitution. It provides no protection against a regulation which is simply
unreasonable or even outrageous in that it has no reasonable connection with any legitimate
public purpose, for in that case only the petitioner's public status is menaced-something to
which he presumably has no 'right' to begin with." Van Alstyne, supra note 4, at 1447.
42. 374 U.S. at 410.
43. "[N]or shall any State ...deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
44. See Van Alstyne, supra note 4, at 1454-57.
45. See San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973).
46. A fundamental right has been defined both as one which is "of the very essence of a
scheme of ordered liberty," Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937), and as one ex-
plicitly or implicitly protected by the Constitution, San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. at 17. Examples of fundamental rights include the right to vote, the right to procre-
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class,47 however, the court evaluates the classification under a standard
of strict scrutiny.4 8 Only classifications that promote a compelling state
interest49 and that provide the least restrictive means of furthering that
interest50 are deemed constitutional under strict scrutiny.
In the unconstitutional conditions context, courts have used the
equal protection analysis most often to evaluate conditions that require
benefit recipients to forego implied constitutional rights, such as the
right to travel.5 ' In Shapiro v. Thompson,52 the Court reviewed Con-
necticut regulations requiring welfare applicants to reside in the state
one year before receiving benefits. Under this scheme, Connecticut de-
nied welfare benefits to a nineteen-year-old unwed mother because she
did not meet the residency requirement.5 3 Although the Court could
have followed the Sherbert analysis and invalidated the statute as an
impermissible interference with a constitutional liberty protected by the
due process clause,54 it instead based its holding on the equal protec-
tion clause.5
5
The Court found that the waiting period created two classes of
ate, and rights guaranteeing fair criminal procedure. Developments in the Lawn-Equal Pro-
jection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1127 (1969). Express constitutional rights, such as first
amendment rights, are also deemed fundamental rights, but they are often protected by
provisions of the Constitution other than the equal protection clause. Id at 1128.
47. The central purpose of the fourteenth amendment was to eliminate all official state
sources of invidious racial discrimination. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 10 (1967). Under
the amendment, the Court has held that statutory distinctions based solely on race, ancestry,
and lineage are suspect. Id at 11; Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Develop-
ments in the Law--Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1065, 1088 (1969).
48. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969) (fundamental right); Loving v. Vir-
ginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (suspect class).
49. 394 U.S. at 634, 637. The state interest required has also been referred to as an
overriding statutory purpose. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. at 11; McLaughlin v. Florida, 379
U.S. 184, 192 (1964). See Blattner, The Supreme Court's "Intermediate" Equal Protection
Decisions; Five Impefect Models of Constitutional Equality, 8 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 777,
781 (1981).
50. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 643 (1973).
51. See, e.g., Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974); Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); see also Note, The Resurrection of the Right-Privlege Dis-
tinction? .4 Critical Look at Maher v. Roe and Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 7 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 165, 177-81 (1979) (discussion of equal protection analysis in cases concerning uncon-
stitutional conditions).
52. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
53. Id at 623.
54, See id at 659 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan would have used the due
process clause to invalidate any undue burden on fundamental rights, such as the right to
travel. Instead of requiring that a compelling state interest justify any infringement of this
right, however, he would have balanced the extent of the interference with the right to travel
against the governmental interests supporting the restriction. After taking all competing
considerations into account, Justice Harlan would have upheld the waiting period require-
ment. Id at 671-76.
55. Id at 641. The Court also ruled on the waiting period requirement adopted by
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needy resident families, one composed of residents who had lived in
the state for more than one year, the other of residents who had re-
cently moved to the state. The first group received benefits, the second
did not.5 6 Finding that the distinction burdened the fundamental right
of interstate travel, and finding no compelling state interest that justi-
fied the distinction, the Court invalidated the waiting period require-
ment for welfare recipients.5 7 Thus, although the courts in Shapiro and
Sherbert used different approaches to analyze conditions, each reached
the same conclusion: conditions must be justified by a compelling state
interest to be upheld.58
Recent Developments
By requiring that public benefit restrictions impairing the constitu-
tional rights of recipients be justified by a compelling state interest,
Sherbert, Shapiro and other decisions in the 1960's and early 1970's
eroded the view that a state could condition the receipt of public bene-
fits on any basis it chose. 59 In several recent cases, however, the Court
has evaluated conditions on public benefits under the less demanding
rational relation test,60 indicating that the Court may be returning to a
modified form of the right-privilege distinction.
61
In Caifano v. Jobst,62 the Court reviewed Social Security Act pro-
visions that mandate termination of secondary benefits when the recipi-
ent marries an individual who is not entitled to receive benefits under
the Act.63 The plaintiff was the disabled child of a qualified wage
earner. After his father's death, he received Social Security benefits
until he married another cerebral palsy victim who was not receiving
Social Security benefits.64 The district court held that the marriage
provisions of the Act violated the equal protection clause.
65
Congress for the District of Columbia and invalidated it under the due process clause of the
fifth amendment. Id at 641-42.
56. Id. at 627.
57. Id at 638.
58. Id; Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963).
59. See note 32 & accompanying text supra. See also Van Alstyne, supra note 4, at
1445-64 (describing several means of circumventing the right-privilege distinction and not-
ing a judicial trend confirming that substantive due process directly protects interests such as
government employment, public education and public-financed housing).
60. See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47
(1977); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
61. See Note, The Resurrection of the Right-Privilege Distinction? A Critical Look at
Maher v. Roe and Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 7 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 165, 210-15 (1979).
62. 434 U.S. 47 (1977).
63. Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 402(d) (1976); see 434 U.S. at 48-50.
64. 434 U.S. at 48. Mrs. Jobst was receiving welfare assistance from Missouri, but no
Social Security benefits. Id at 48 n.l.
65. Id at 49.
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A unanimous Supreme Court disagreed, finding that the marriage
rule bore a rational relationship to the congressional purpose of deter-mining dependency.66 Noting that the Social Security program was
designed to provide protection to dependent members of the wage
earner's family, the Court observed that Congress, instead of examin-
ing each case separately, had elected to use simple criteria, such as age
and marital status, to determine probable dependency.67 The Court
concluded that marital status was a reliable yardstick for determining
dependency and that the limited exception allowing two beneficiaries
who marry to retain benefits was a reasonable means of eliminating
some of the hardship imposed by the marriage rule. Congress was not
obligated to take a larger step and provide protection for people such as
the Jobsts. 6
8
Although the Court in Jobst made few references to any infringe-
ment on the right to marry,69 it squarely addressed this issue in
Zablocki v. Redhail.70 Zablocki involved a Wisconsin statute7' that re-
quired a parent who did not have custody of his or her child, but who
was under court orders to provide support for the child, to obtain a
court's permission to marry.72 Justice Marshall, writing for the major-
ity, concluded that the statute violated equal protection because it in-
terfered with the exercise of the fundamental right to marry73 and was
66. Id at 42-53. Jobst came to the Court on direct appeal from the district court. Id at
49-50.
67. Id at 52.
68. Id at 53-58.
69. The court acknowledged that Social Security Act provisions "may have an impact
on a secondary beneficiary's desire to marry, and may make some suitors less welcome than
others," but noted that neither party had suggested that Congress harbored any antagonism
toward a class of marriages. Id at 58. The Court made no attempt to reconcile the Social
Security Act provisions with the fundamental right to marry.
70. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
71. Wis. STAT. § 245.10(1), (4), (5) (1973); see 434 U.S. at 375.
72. The plaintiff in Zablocki was ordered, as a result of a paternity suit, to pay for the
support of his child born out of wedlock and in the mother's custody. As the plaintiff was
unemployed and indigent, he was unable to make the support payments. In 1974, the plain-
tiffs application for a marriage license was denied because he did not obtain court permis-
sion to marry. Under Wis. STAT. § 245.10, such permission would have been denied
because of the plaintiffs outstanding support obligations. The plaintiff challenged the stat-
ute as violative of the equal protection and due process clauses of the fourteenth
amendment.
73. 434 U.S. at 388-89. Marriage was first declared a fundamental right in Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), although previous cases had emphasized the importance of mar-
riage and family matters to the individual and had suggested that this interest deserved
constitutional protection. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). For discussion of marriage as a fundamental right, see
LeFrancois, The Constitution and the ' Rght" to Marry: .4 JurisprudentialAnalysis, 5 OKLA.
CrrY U.L. REv. 507 (1980); Developments in the Lan-The Constitution and the Family, 93
July 1982]
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not justified by a sufficiently important state interest.74 Affirming that
the right to marry is fundamental, the Court qualified the character of
the right:
[W]e do not mean to suggest that every state regulation which relates
in any way to the incidents of or prerequisites for marriage must be
subjected to rigorous scrutiny. To the contrary, reasonable regula-
tions that do not signiftcantly interfere with decisions to enter into the
marital relationship may legitimately be imposed. . . . The statu-
tory classification at issue here, however, clearly does interfere di-
rectly and substantially with the right to marry. 5
The majority distinguished the Wisconsin statute in Zablocki from
the Social Security Act provisions in Jobst on the basis of the directness
and substantiality of the interference with the freedom to marry inher-
ent in the Wisconsin statute.76 The Zablocki Court emphasized the
more indirect interference in Jobst: "The Social Security provisions
placed no direct legal obstacle in the path of persons desiring to get
married, and. . . there was no evidence that the laws significantly dis-
couraged, let alone made 'practically impossible,' any marriages. '77
Nonetheless, in dissent, Justice Rehnquist argued that the extent of the
burden placed on the right to marry by the Social Security Act provi-
sions challenged in Jobst did not differ substantially from the extent of
the burden imposed by the Wisconsin statute challenged in Zablocki.
78
The Jobst and Zablocki opinions have altered the fundamental
rights branch of equal protection analysis by requiring that statutory
classifications directly and substantially burden the exercise of funda-
mental rights before they need to be subjected to strict scrutiny.79 The
HARV. L. REV. 1156, 1248-70 (1980); Note, Caif/ano v. Jobst, Zablocki v. Redhail, and the
Fundamental Right to Marry, 18 J. FAM. L. 587 (1980).
74. 434 U.S. at 388-91. The Court did not evaluate the Wisconsin statute under the
strict scrutiny standard. Instead, the Court conducted a "critical examination" of the state
interests advanced in support of the classification. Id at 383. Such interests, Justice Mar-
shall wrote, must be "sufficiently important" and the statute must be "closely tailored to
effectuate only those interests." Id
75. Id at 386-87 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
76. Id at 387 n.12.
77. Id (emphasis added).
78. Id. at 408. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting): "In the case of some applicants, this [Wis-
consin] statute makes the proposed marriage legally impossible for financial reasons; in a
similar number of extreme cases, the Social Security Act makes the proposed marriage prac-
tically impossible for the same reasons." Justice Rehnquist would have applied the rational
relation test in both cases. Id at 407. At least one commentator agreed with Justice Rehn-
quist, arguing that the inconsistent holdings of the factually similar Jobst and Zablocki cases
were not adequately explained by the Court. See LeFrancois, The Constitution and the
'Right"to Marry. A JurisprudentialAnalysis, 5 OKLA. CITY U.L. REv. 507 (1980). Professor
LeFrancois suggested that the different results in the two cases show confused reasoning, id
at 527-37, and called for judicial reevaluation of equal protection and fundamental rights
and development of a more coherent judicial analysis. Id at 559.
79. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. at 386-87 & n.12; Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. at 54-58.
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effect of this added "direct and substantial" requirement is to allow
conditions on public benefit programs if the conditions only indirectly
discourage the exercise of constitutional rights80 and if they meet the
rational relation test.
Harris v. McRae8' demonstrates the use of the Zablocki "direct
and substantial" test in evaluating conditions placed on public benefit
programs. In McRae, a majority of the United States Supreme Court
upheld the Hyde Amendment82 against due process and equal protec-
tion challenges.8 3 Under the Hyde Amendment, Medicaid funds
84
would be available only for certain medically necessary abortions;8 5 all
expenses related to childbirth, however, would be provided.86 Al-
though in the earlier case of Roe v. Wade8 7 the Court had found that
the constitutionally protected right to privacy included the freedom to
80. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47 (1978).
81. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
82. The initial version of the Hyde Amendment was enacted in fiscal year 1977. Pub.
L. No. 94-439, § 209, 90 Stat. 1418, 1434 (1976). A subsequent version of the Amendment,
in force for fiscal years 1978 and 1979, provided additional exceptions. Pub. L. No. 95-205,
§ 101, 91 Stat. 146G, 1460 (1977); Pub. L. No. 94-480, § 210, 92 Stat. 1567, 1586 (1978). A
third version of the Amendment was passed for fiscal year 1980. Pub. L. No. 96-123, § 109,
93 Stat. 923, 926 (1979). In Harris v. McRae, the Court referred to all three versions generi-
cally as the "Hyde Amendment" and found all three to be constitutional. 448 U.S. at 303
n.4.
83. 448 U.S. at 326-27. The decision was reached by a closely divided court: Justices
Stewart, White, Powell, Rehnquist, and Chief Justice Burger formed the majority; Justices
Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens dissented.
84. Under the Medicaid program, see 42 U.S.C. § 1396 etseq. (1976), states with medi-
cal assistance plans meeting federal requirements receive federal funds to enable them to
furnish health care services to recipients of public assistance. .d § 1396.
85. The initial version of the Hyde Amendment withheld federal funds for Medicaid
abortions "except where the life of the mother would be endangered if the fetus were carried
to term." Pub. L. No. 94-439, § 209, 90 Stat. 1418, 1434 (1976). Under the version in force
for fiscal years 1978 and 1979, funds were available for abortions when "severe and long-
lasting physical health damage to the mother would result if the pregnancy were carried to
term when so determined by two physicians." Pub. L. No. 95-205, § 101, 91 Stat. 1460, 1460
(1977); Pub. L. No. 95-480, § 210, 92 Stat. 1567, 1586 (1978). Victims of rape or incest could
also obtain Medicaid abortion funding provided the rape or incest was reported to the police
or a public health service. 1d The third version of the Amendment, passed for fiscal year
1980, abandoned the exception for severe and long-lasting physical health damage to the
mother, but retained the rape or incest exception. Hyde Amendment, Pub. L. No. 96-123,
§ 109, 93 Stat. 923, 926 (1979).
86. In order to be eligible for Medicaid funds, participating states must provide inpa-
tient hospital services, outpatient hospital services, laboratory and x-ray services, skilled
nursing and physician services, and family planning services. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1386a(a)(13)(B),
1396d(a)(1)-(5) (1976). The Hyde Amendment withdrew federal funding for certain medi-
cally necessary abortions, thereby relieving the states of any obligation to provide such abor-
tions. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. at 310-11 & n.16.
87. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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terminate a pregnancy, 88 the McRae Court held that the Hyde Amend-
ment did not impinge on a "liberty" protected by the due process
clause. 89 Applying a "direct and substantial" requirement like that
used in Zablocki,90 the McRae Court held that the Hyde Amendment
did not directly interfere with a woman's freedom to choose to have an
abortion. "The Hyde Amendment. . .places no governmental obstacle
in the path of a woman who chooses to terminate her pregnancy, but
rather, by means of unequal subsidization of abortion and other medi-
cal services, encourages alternative activity deemed in the public
interest."91
Having concluded that the Hyde Amendment did not directly im-
pinge on the due process liberty interest recognized in Roe v. Wade, the
Court next turned to the equal protection arguments. As the Court had
concluded that no fundamental rights were threatened, it applied the
rational relation test. Measuring by this standard, the majority found
that the Hyde Amendment bore a rational relationship to the govern-
ment's legitimate interest in protecting the potential life of the fetus and
that therefore the Hyde Amendment was constitutionally sound.92
The decisions in Harris v. McARae, 93 Califano v. Jobst,94 and
Zablocki v. Redhai 95 seriously limit the applicability of Shapiro v.
Thompson 96 and Sherbert v. Verner97 in unconstitutional condition
cases. The Shapiro and Sherbert decisions required a compelling state
interest to justify conditions placed on public benefit programs that af-
fected fundamental rights, whether the impact was direct or indirect. 9
The Jobst, Zablocki, and McRae decisions limited this principle by
holding that only conditions that directly and substantially restrict the
exercise of a right trigger strict scrutiny analysis.99 As the McRae
88. Id at 154. The Court emphasized, however, that "this right is not unqualified and
must be considered against important state interests in regulation." Id
89. 448 U.S. at 317-18.
90. See text accompanying notes 73-76 supra.
91. 448 U.S. at 315 (emphasis added).
92. Id at 324-26.
93. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
94. 434 U.S. 47 (1977).
95. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
96. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
97. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
98. See text accompanying note 58 supra.
99. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. at 312-14; Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. at 386-87; see
also Appelton, Beyond the Limits of Reproductive Choice: The Contributions ofthe Abortion
Funding Cases to Fundamental Rights Analysis and to the Welfare Rights Thesis, 81 COLUM.
L. REV. 721, 724, 734-37 (1981) (author concludes that McRae adds a new requirement to
fundamental rights analysis: state action must constitute an "impingement" before it will be
subjected to strict scrutiny. "Impingement" arises only when the state actively violates fun-
damental rights; a refusal to appropriate funds, despite effect on fundamental rights, is not
impingement).
[Vol. 33
CONDITIONS ON PUBLIC BENEFITS
Court explained, unless a condition constitutes a "penalty" on the exer-
cise of a fundamental right, it will be upheld if it meets the rational
relation test.3 0
Conditioned Public Benefits: The California Analysis
Danskin v. San Diego Unified School District
For the last 35 years the California courts have viewed restrictions
on public benefits with suspicion. In Danskin v. San Diego Unffed
School District, 0  the California Supreme Court rejected the right-
privilege distinction as a per se justification for government programs
conditioned on the loss of constitutional rights.' 0 2 In Danskin, mem-
bers of the San Diego American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) re-
quested permission from the school board to use a school auditorium
for a series of lectures on the Bill of Rights. Under the Civic Center
Act,'0 3 the San Diego School Board was required to grant the free use
of school auditoriums to associations formed for educational pur-
poses. 104 Another section of the Act, however, directed school districts
to deny auditorium use to "subversive elements."' 05
The San Diego School Board insisted that the ACLU submit an
affidavit stating that it was not a subversive element. When the ACLU
refused, the Board withheld permission to use the auditorium. ACLU
representatives then sought a writ of mandamus to compel the Board to
grant it the use of the school facilities.'0 6
Under the Holmes right-privilege theory, the Board validly could
100. 448 U.S. at 317 n.19.
101. 28 Cal. 2d 536, 171 P.2d 885 (1946).
102. Id at 545-46, 171 P.2d at 891.
103. 1943 Cal. Stat. 690-91 (current version codified at CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 40048-
40050 (West 1978)).
104. 28 Cal. 2d at 540, 171 P.2d at 888. "There is a civic center at each and every public
school building and grounds within the state where the citizens, parent-teachers association,
Camp Fire Girls, Boy Scout troops, farmers' organizations, school-community advisory
councils, senior citizens' organizations, clubs and associations formed for recreational, edu-
cational, political, economic, artistic, or moral activities of the public school districts may
engage in supervised recreational activities, and where they may meet and discuss, from
time to time, as they may desire, any subjects and questions which in their judgment apper-
tain to the educational, political, economic, artistic, and moral interests of the citizens of the
communities in which they reside." CAL. EDUC. CODE § 40048 (West 1978) (formerly CAL.
EDUC. CODE § 19431).
. 105. 1945 Cal. Stat. 2301-02 (formerly codified at CAL. EDUC. CODE § 19432). A sub-
versive element was defined by the statute as "any person who is affiliated with any organi-
zation which advocates or has for its object.., the overthrow of the present government of
the United States... by force or violence or other unlawful means, or any organization
... which advocates or has for its object ... the overthrow of the present government of
the United States.. . ." Id at 2302.
106. 28 Cal. 2d at 538-39, 171 P.2d at 887-88.
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have conditioned the use of its facilities on the submission of the re-
quired affidavits. Although the ACLU may have had a protected right
to espouse subversive convictions, it did not have a right to use the
school auditorium to do So. 10 7 Justice Traynor, writing for the Califor-
nia Supreme Court, disagreed with the right-privilege distinction. He
reasoned that, although the state is not obligated to make school build-
ings available for public meetings, once it elects to do so it cannot make
the privilege of holding a meeting dependent on conditions that would
deprive any members of the public of their constitutional rights.
08
By requiring groups to submit affidavits proving their nonsubver-
sive convictions and affiliations as a condition of using a school audito-
rium, the Civic Center Act provisions compelled groups that were
unwilling to submit such proof to forfeit their rights of free speech and
assembly in a public forum. 10 9 Finding no "grave and immediate dan-
ger" to state interests that would justify a restriction on first amend-
ment freedoms, the court struck down the provisions of the Civic
Center Act restricting use of the buildings under the first and four-
teenth amendments. 
10
Bagley v. Washington Township Hospital District
Danskin guided subsequent California courts in deciding the va-
lidity of conditioned public benefit programs." ' I However, the Danskin
holding, that the government cannot condition privileges on the forfei-
ture of constitutional rights, lacked the flexibility to resolve problems
when governmental interests necessitated restriction of rights."
2
Twenty years after Danskin, the California Supreme Court addressed
the issue of governmental interests in Bagley v. Washington Township
107. See notes 25-28 & accompanying text supra.
108. 28 Cal. 2d at 545, 171 P.2d at 891.
109. id. at 548, 171 P.2d at 892-93.
110. Id. at 550-52, 554-55, 171 P.2d at 894, 896-97.
111. See, e.g., Wirta v. Alameda-Contra Costa Transit Dist., 68 Cal. 2d 51, 434 P.2d 932,
64 Cal. Rptr. 430 (1967); Fort v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 61 Cal. 2d 331, 392 P.2d 385, 38 Cal.
Rptr. 625 (1964); ACLU v. Board of Educ., 55 Cal. 2d 167, 359 P.2d 45, 10 Cal. Rptr. 647
(1961).
112. Professor Van Alstyne noted that the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions pre-
serves the appearance of judicial objectivity and expedites decisionmaking. It asks one
question: "[D]id the regulation in question condition the petitioner's privilege upon the
waiver of a named constitutional right?" Van Alstyne, supra note 13, at 1447-48. He also
noted a problem with the doctrine: "Mr. Justice Holmes ... was probably correct in believ-
ing that [the doctrine]. . . evaded the more difficult question raised by justifiable state regu-
lations." Id at 1448.
The Danskin court did consider governmental interests, but held that the state may only
protect against "'grave and immediate danger to interests that the state may lawfully pro-
tect.'" 28 Cal. 2d at 550, 171 P.2d at 894 (quoting West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943)).
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Hospital District. 3 A nurse's aide was dismissed from her job at a
public hospital for participating in a campaign to recall from office cer-
tain of the District's directors. The plaintiffs participation in the cam-
paign consisted of attending meetings, circulating a recall petition, and
distributing literature during off-duty hours." 4 The District defended
the discharge first on the basis of former California Government Code
section 3205, which prohibited local agency employees from actively
participating in agency election campaigns or in campaigns to recall
local agency officials." 5 The District's second argument was that the
plaintiff held her hospital position "at the pleasure" of the District and
that therefore the District could terminate her employment for any
reason. 116
The Bagley court disposed of the District's second argument by
noting that, although an individual can claim no constitutional right to
public employment, the government cannot condition such employ-
ment upon any terms it may choose. Quoting Danskin with approval,
the court emphasized that the government cannot grant public benefits
conditioned upon an arbitrary deprivation of constitutional rights."
7
The court, however, also rejected any suggestion that the government
may never condition the receipt of benefits upon the waiver of constitu-
tional rights. It recognized that circumstances may "inexorably...
require" that the government impose such conditions." 8 To distin-
guish those cases in which conditions on public benefit programs are
warranted from those in which the conditions are improper, the court
constructed a three-pronged test:
[A] governmental agency which would require a waiver of constitu-
tional rights as a condition of public employment must demonstrate:
(1) that the political restraints rationally relate to the enhancement of
the public service, (2) that the benefits which the public gains by the
restraints outweigh the resulting impairment of constitutional rights,
and (3) that no alternatives less subversive of constitutional rights are
113. 65 Cal. 2d 499, 421 P.2d 409, 55 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1966).
114. Id at 502, 421 P.2d at 412, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 404.
115. Act of July 19, 1963, ch. 9.5, § 1, 1963 Cal. Stat. 4078, 4079 (repealed 1976). Section
3203, added to the California Government Code in 1976, provides: "Except as otherwise
provided in this chapter, or as necessary to meet requirements of federal law as it pertains to
a particular employee or employees, no restriction shall be placed on the political activities
of any officer or employee of a state or local agency." CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3203 (West
1980).
116. 65 Cal. 2d at 503, 421 P.2d at 412-13, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 404-05.
117. Id at 503-04, 421 P.2d at 413, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 405.
118. Id at 505, 421 P.2d at 414, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 406. The court explained: "Just as we
have rejected the fallacious argument that the power of government to impose such condi-
tions knows no limits, so must we acknowledge that government may, when circumstances
inexorably so require, impose conditions upon the enjoyment of publicly conferred benefits
despite a resulting qualification of constitutional rights." Id
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available. 1"9
Applying this test to the restrictions imposed by Government Code
section 3205, the court concluded that they were unjustified. 120 The
District had contended that section 3205 reasonably related to hospital
employment and administration by preventing the disruption that
would occur if employees could campaign actively against their super-
visors.' 21 As section 3205 prohibited an employee from participation in
the campaign of any local agency officer, including an officer who was
not the employee's supervisor, 22 the court held the statute to be
too broadly drawn.1
23
Thus, the District failed to meet the first part of the test because it
could not show that the broad sweep of the imposed conditions related
to the purposes of hospital employment and services. It also failed to
satisfy the second part of the test because the blanket prohibition on
political activities did not produce any benefits to the employers or to
the general public commensurate with the waiver of constitutional
rights. 24 Finally, the District failed to satisfy the third part of the test;
although the court did not review alternatives available to the legisla-
ture, it did imply that a less restrictive statute could have been
119. Id at 501-02, 505-07, 421 P.2d at 411, 414-15, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 403, 406-07. The
court noted that the state might also meet the first step of the test by showing that enjoyment
of the benefit by the class excluded by the conditions "would affirmatively harm compelling
public interests." d at 506 n.4, 421 P.2d at 414 n.4, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 406 n.4. In formulating
the three-pronged test, the court relied heavily on Professor O'Neil's assertion that several
factors are relevant in determining the validity of conditions placed on benefit programs.
O'Neil, supra note 1, at 463-78. Professor O'Neil suggested that courts take the following
factors into account: (1) Could the object of the condition be achieved directly? (2) How
relevant is the condition to the benefit? (3) Are there alternative means of effecting the
governmental interest? (4) How important is the benefit to the individual recipient? (5) Are
equivalent benefits available in the private sector? (6) How does the condition influence the
beneficiary's judgment? (7) What is the form of condition? (8) What procedures are pro-
vided to determine a breach of the condition? He stressed that no one factor should deter-
mine the result; courts should attempt to balance all of the elements. A case-by-case
approach is better than a rigid test. Id
Although the Bagley court did not consider all of Professor O'Neil's factors, it accepted
the argument that the problem of conditioned benefits is too complex to be decided by an
unvarying rule. 65 Cal. 2d at 505, 421 P.2d at 414, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 406.
120. 65 Cal. 2d at 509, 421 P.2d at 417, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 409.
121. Id at 508, 421 P.2d at 416, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 408. The District cited Fort v. Civil
Serv. Comm'n, 61 Cal. 2d 331, 392 P.2d 385, 38 Cal. Rptr. 625 (1964), in which the court had
acknowledged that some restrictions on employee political activities were justified.
122. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3201 (West 1980), defining "local agency" as a "county,
city, city and county, political subdivision, district or municipal corporation."
123. 65 Cal. 2d at 508, 421 P.2d at 416, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 408. Because the court ruled that
§ 3205 was too broad, it did not decide whether, in the particular application, the District
could be considered the plaintiff's supervisor and therefore could proscribe her participation
in a recall campaign. Id
124. Id at 510-11, 421 P.2d at 417, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 409.
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drafted.125
Developments in the Bagley Test
The three-pronged Bagley test has provided a versatile analytical
tool for later courts reviewing conditions placed on public benefit pro-
grams. Although the test most often has served to evaluate conditions
that infringe on the first amendment rights of public employees, 126 its
application has not been limited to this situation. Citing Bagley, Cali-
fornia courts have protected the recipients of governmental benefits,
such as welfare, public education, and the use of public forums, from
conditions that threatened constitutional rights, including the right to
privacy, the right to be secure in the home, and the right to operate a
private school.127 Bagley has also been extended to situations outside
the public benefit context.
128
The year after Bagley was decided, the California Supreme Court
decided Parrish v. Civil Service Commission,129 in which it extended the
Bagley principles to protect the fourth amendment rights of welfare
recipients. In Parrish, the court reviewed the plaintiff's claim for rein-
statement as a social worker in Alameda County. He had been fired
for "insubordination" when he refused to participate in a series of
morning raids on the private homes of county welfare recipients.
130
125. Id at 509-11, 421 P.2d at 416-17, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 408-09. Implicit in the holding
that § 3205 was excessively broad is the finding that a less offensive alternative was avail-
able. See id at 508* 421 P.2d at 416, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 408. For a discussion of Bagley, see
Note, The Supreme Court of California 1966-1967, 55 CALIF. L. REV. 1059, 1083-86 (1967).
126. See, ag., Vogel v. County of Los Angeles, 68 Cal. 2d 18,434 P.2d 961, 64 Cal. Rptr.
409 (1967); Rosenfield v. Malcolm, 65 Cal. 2d 559, 421 P.2d 697, 55 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1967);
Finot v. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ., 250 Cal. App. 2d 189, 58 Cal. Rptr. 520 (1967).
127. See, e.g., City of Carmel-by-the-Sea v. Young, 2 Cal. 3d 259, 466 P.2d 225, 85 Cal.
Rptr. 1 (1970) (protecting city officials from condition that burdened right to privacy in
financial matters); Parrish v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 66 Cal. 2d 260, 425 P.2d 223, 57 Cal. Rptr.
623 (1967) (protecting fourth amendment rights of welfare recipients); Binet-Montessori,
Inc. v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 98 Cal. App. 3d 991, 160 Cal. Rptr. 38 (1979)
(protecting right to operate a private school in a leased public building).
128. The Bagley test has been used in criminal cases to restrain state practices that in-
fringe on defendants' constitutional rights. See People v. Miller, 7 Cal. 3d 219, 224, 496 P.2d
1228, 1231-32, 101 Cal. Rptr. 860, 863-64 (1972) (defendant's refusal to waive fourth amend-
ment seizure rights cannot be used as evidence of criminal conduct); see also People v. Ma-
son, 5 Cal. 3d 759, 767-68, 488 P.2d 630, 634-35, 97 Cal. Rptr. 302, 306-07 (1971) (Peters, J.,
dissenting) (state should not be allowed to condition defendant's probation on requirement
that he completely waive his fourth amendment rights).
129. 66 Cal. 2d 260, 425 P.2d 223, 57 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1967).
130. Id at 264, 425 P.2d at 226, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 626. To decide the merits of the case,
the court first had to determine whether the searches were constitutional. If they were not,
the plaintiff could not be fired for insubordination. Id at 265, 425 P.2d at 226, 57 Cal. Rptr.
at 626.
The searches, called "Operation Bedcheck," were conducted at the order of the Ala-
meda County Board of Supervisors, purportedly for the purpose of discovering unreported
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The court found that these warrantless searches violated both the recip-
ients' fourth amendment rights and their implied right to privacy.
131
Justice Tobriner, writing for the majority, analyzed the case as an
"unconstitutional conditions" problem and applied the Bagley test to
determine whether the county justifiably could require welfare recipi-
ents to consent to illegal searches. 32 In applying the first prong of
Bagley-whether requiring such consent related to the purposes of wel-
fare legislation-the court recognized that a requirement to consent to
searches might facilitate the detection of welfare fraud. The court
could not determine, however, whether the first prong of the test had
been met because the evidence failed to "establish the incidence of wel-
fare fraud or the efficacy of mass morning raids in reducing such
fraud."' 133 For the same reason, the court did not balance the benefits
derived from imposing the condition against the corresponding loss of
rights, as required by the second prong of the Bagley test.1
34
The lack of evidence was inconsequential, however, because the
county failed to establish, under the third prong, that no less offensive
alternatives existed to achieve the ends sought by the statute.' 35 The
morning raids were not limited to the homes of recipients who were
suspected of fraud. Instead, evidence showed that, to prove the low
cohabitation among recipients. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 11351 (repealed 1971): "[T]he
amount of the grant [to a needy child] shall be computed after consideration is given to the
income of. . such adult male person [who lives with and assumes the role of spouse to the
mother]."
131. 66 Cal. 2d at 270-72, 425 P.2d at 230-31, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 630-31.
132. Id. at 271, 425 P.2d at 230, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 630. The court noted that "Operation
Bedcheck" rested on the assumption that "a welfare agency may withhold aid from recipi-
ents who do not willingly submit to random, exploratory searches of their homes; from its
inception, the operation contemplated the use of such searches to threaten the withdrawal of
welfare benefits from anyone who insisted upon his rights of privacy and repose. . . . [Tihe
power of government to decline to extend to its citizens the enjoyment of a particular set of
benefits does not embrace the supposedly 'lesser' power to condition the receipt of those
benefits upon any and all terms." Id at 270-71, 425 P.2d at 230, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 630.
Before the court reached the question of unconstitutional conditions, it considered two
other issues: whether the county's searches had to meet the standards ordinarily applied to
searches for evidence of a crime, and whether the beneficiaries' consent to be searched made
the searches legal. Id at 265-70, 425 P.2d at 226-30, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 626-30. As to the first
issue, the Commission claimed that the purpose of "Operation Bedcheck" was merely to
secure proof of welfare ineligibility. The court noted that welfare fraud constituted a crime
and held that the searches were unconstitutional unless the county could "show compliance
with the standards which govern searches for evidence of crime." As the county had no
probable cause and no warrants, the searches were invalid. Id at 267-68, 425 P.2d at 228, 57
Cal. Rptr. at 628. As to the second issue, the court held that the consents were ineffective
because of the coercive circumstances under which they were obtained. Id at 268-70, 425
P.2d 228-30, 57 Cal. Rptr. 628-30.
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incidence of fraud in the welfare system, the county director sought to
search the homes of nonsuspect recipients.136 Such an objective, Justice
Tobriner emphasized, did not justify indiscriminate raids upon the
homes of persons selected solely because their honesty could be ex-
ploited. 137 As the court found the searches, and the regulation requir-
ing welfare recipients to consent to such searches, unconstitutional
under the fourth and fourteenth amendments, it concluded that the
plaintiffs failure to participate in the illegal searches was justified; thus,
his termination was without good cause. 13
8
After Parrish, California courts only occasionally used the Bagley
test to evaluate conditions on public benefit programs. While some
courts conscientiously applied each step of the three-part test, 139 others
noted the Bagley requirements but failed to perform the balancing pro-
cess mandated by step two;140 still other courts confused Bagley with
the strict scrutiny standard, applying this rigid standard to invalidate
conditions that impinged on public benefit recipients' constitutional
rights. 1
41
Bagley in the 1980's
Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers
In Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers,'42 the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court revived the Bagley test to strike down abortion
funding restrictions. Except in a few limited cases, the 1978, 1979, and
1980 Budget Acts denied Medi-Cal funding for abortions to those wo-
men who wanted to terminate their pregnancies, but provided for the
136. Id at 273, 425 P.2d at 232, 57 CaL Rptr. at 632.
137. Justice Tobriner described the overreaching of the county's operation: "[So strik-
ing is the disparity between the operation's declared purpose and the means employed, so
broad its gratuitous reach, and so convincing the evidence that improper considerations dic-
tated its ultimate scope that no valid link remains between that operation and its proffered
justification." Id
138. Id at 275-77, 425 P.2d at 233-34, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 633-34. For a discussion of
Parrish, see Pearlman, Wefare Administration and the JA'ghts of Wefare Recpients, 29 HAS-
TrINGs L. 19, 28-32 (1977).
139. See, ag., Binet-Montessori, Inc. v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 98 Cal.
App. 3d 991, 160 Cal. Rptr. 38 (1979); Finot v. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ., 250 Cal. App. 2d
189, 58 Cal. Rptr. 520 (1967).
140. E.g., City of Carmel-by-the-Sea v. Young, 2 Cal. 3d 259, 466 P.2d 225, 85 Cal.
Rptr. 1 (1970); Vogel v. County of Los Angeles, 68 Cal. 2d 18, 434 P.2d 961, 64 Cal. Rptr.
409 (1967).
141. See, eg., White v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d 757, 772, (1975), 533 P.2d 222, 232, 120 Cal.
Rptr. 94, 104; King v. California Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 25 Cal. App. 3d 199, 101
Cal. Rptr. 660 (1972); cf. Purdy & Fitzpatrick v. State, 71 Cal. 2d 566, 456 P.2d 645, 79 Cal.
Rptr. 77 (1969) (applying strict scrutiny to a statute denying aliens public work contracts).
142. 29 Cal. 3d 252, 625 P.2d 779, 172 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1981).
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funding of childbirth expenses of women who chose to bear children. 43
The plaintiffs contended that the Budget Acts violated women's rights
to privacy, due process, and equal protection as guaranteed by the Cali-
fornia Constitution.1
44
The court noted that the Budget Act provisions were similar to the
Hyde Amendment restrictions that had withstood federal constitutional
challenge in Harris v. McRae, 4 but pointed out that Myers required
application of California law.' 46 Thus, the California Supreme Court
conducted an independent analysis to determine whether the restric-
tions on Medi-Cal funding for abortions violated the California Consti-
tution. 47  In the context of the independent grounds analysis, the
California court framed the issue as
whether the state, having enacted a general program to provide med-
ical services to the poor, may selectively withhold such benefits from
otherwise qualified persons solely because such persons seek to exer-
cise their constitutional right to procreative choice in a manner which
the state does not favor and does not wish to support.'
48
Applying the Bagley test,' 49 the court found that the Budget Acts
failed all three prongs. First, the court maintained, restrictions on
Medi-Cal funding bore no relationship to the program's purposes of
affording health care and remedial services to recipients of public
assistance;' 5 0 in some cases, the Budget Act provisions would impede
Medi-Cal objectives by denying abortion funding to women for whom
pregnancy would pose a significant health hazard.15'
Second, the court held that the utility of imposing these restrictions
on abortion funding did not manifestly outweigh the resulting impair-
ment of constitutional rights. 52 The court examined the importance of
the constitutional rights at stake-the woman's right to life and the
right to choose whether to bear children-and determined that these
rights were among the most intimate and fundamental of all Califor-
nia's constitutional rights. 53 Finding that the Budget Act provisions
severely impaired these important rights, the court concluded that only
the most compelling of state interests could justify such significant im-
pairment. The court then examined three state interests--curtailing
143. See note 13 supra.
144. 29 Cal. 3d at 256, 625 P.2d at 780, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 867; see CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1
(privacy); art. I, § 7 (due process, equal protection).
145. 448 U.S. 297 (1980). See notes 5-7, 81-92 & accompanying text supra.
146. 29 Cal. 3d at 257, 625 P.2d at 781, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 868.
147. Id at 262, 625 P.2d at 784, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 871.
148. Id at 256-57, 625 P.2d at 781, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 868.
149. Id at 257-58, 625 P.2d at 781, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 868.
150. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 14000 (West 1980).
151. 29 Cal. 3d at 271-72 & n.20, 625 P.2d at 790 & n.20, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 878 & n.20.
152. Id at 282, 625 P.2d at 797, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 884.
153. Id at 275, 625 P.2d at 793, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 880.
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Medi-Cal expenses, encouraging childbirth, and protecting the life of
the fetus-and concluded that these interests did not manifestly out-
weigh the loss of constitutional rights.
54
Finally, the court concluded that the provisions were drawn too
broadly. The state could use less offensive alternatives to promote its
interests in encouraging childbirth and aiding women who choose to
bear children.
155
As the Budget Act provisions failed to meet the Bagley require-
ments, the court invalidated them under article I, section 1 of the Cali-
fornia Constitution, which explicitly protects an individual's
inalienable right to privacy.156 Justice Tobriner, writing for the major-
ity, emphasized that California, through discriminatory financing, may
not indirectly nullify a woman's right to obtain an abortion.
157
The majority opinion both explained and expanded the Bagley
test. The court explained that the test applies to a discriminatory or
restricted government benefit program whether or not it erects a "new
or additional obstacle that impedes the exercise of constitutional
rights."' 58 Thus, the court distinguished the Bagley test from the fed-
eral analysis of unconstitutional conditions. Under the federal ap-
proach, the strict scrutiny standard is applied only to conditions that
directly and substantially impair constitutional rights.' 59 The court
also emphasized the importance of the second prong of the Bagley
analysis and explained how future courts might better perform the
154. Id at 273-82, 625 P.2d at 791-97, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 878-84.
155. If the Budget Act restrictions were intended to prevent indigent women from ob-
taining abortions, the court noted, the Act failed the second part of the Bagley test by subor-
dinating the woman's right to procreative choice and did not have to be evaluated under the
"least offensive alternatives" doctrine. Id at 282-83, 625 P.2d at 797, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 884.
However, as the Attorney General suggested an alternative purpose of the restrictions-to
aid poor women who want to have children but cannot afford the expense of childbirth-the
court applied the third component of the Bagley test and concluded that California could
achieve this purpose without burdening the right of procreative choice simply by funding
impartially the expenses of childbirth and abortion. Id at 283, 625 P.2d at 797, 172 Cal.
Rptr. at 884. A decision to fund both childbirth and abortions would not jeopardize Medi-
Cal funds for women who preferred childbirth, because those who ordinarily would choose
to have abortions, in the absence of the Budget Act restrictions, would be forced to draw
upon Medi-Cal funds for their childbirth expenses. In fact, a decision to provide funds only
for childbirth would lead to greater depletion of Medi-Cal resources. See id at 277, 625
P.2d at 794, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 881 ("[W]hatever money is saved by refusing to fund abortions
will be spent many times over in paying maternity care and childbirth expenses and support-
ing the children of indigent mothers.").
156. Id at 284-85, 625 P.2d at 798-99, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 885-86.
157. Id at 284, 625 P.2d at 798, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 885: "There is no greater power than
the power of the purse. If the government can use it to nullify constitutional rights, by
conditioning benefits only upon the sacrifice of such rights, the Bill of Rights could eventu-
ally become a yellowing scrap of paper."
158. Id at 257, 625 P.2d at 781, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 868.
159. d See notes 79-80, 99-100 & accompanying text supra.
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weighing and balancing process. Principally, the Myers court stressed
the need to examine the nature and importance of the right at issue and
then consider the degree to which this right actually is threatened by
the proposed condition.1 60 Finally, the court expanded the balancing
test, recognizing that a condition on public benefits that curtails the
constitutional rights of the poor alone should be viewed more suspi-
ciously than a condition that applies to both rich and poor.'
6'
Chief Justice Bird, concurring, rejected the majority's use of the
Bagley test, but reached the same conclusion as the majority by apply-
ing the traditional strict scrutiny standard to the Budget Act provi-
sions.162 Finding no difference between direct infringements and
indirect infringements on fundamental rights, Chief Justice Bird dis-
agreed with any implication in the majority opinion that indirect im-
pairments of constitutional rights may be justified by anything less than
a compelling state interest. 63 The balancing required by the Bagley
analysis, she argued, presents a task the judiciary is not competent to
perform. 64 Also rejecting the majority's use of the Bagley test, Justice
Richardson, in dissent, would have evaluated the Budget Acts under
the rational relation test.' 65 For Justice Richardson, the issue was not
whether women may exercise their constitutional right to abortion
without undue governmental interference, but "whether they have a
right to abort free of charge and at taxpayer expense."'166 Citing Harris
v. McRae, Justice Richardson noted that the United States Constitu-
tion does not require a state to pay for the exercise of fundamental
rights. 167 Similarly, he contended, the California constitutional provi-
sion protecting the right of privacy does not encompass the right of
"constitutional access to the public treasury for all indigents who want
free abortions."'' 68 As no fundamental rights were directly impaired by
the Budget Acts, Justice Richardson would have deferred to the legisla-
ture as the ultimate authority for the selection of those benefits and
services to be included in the state welfare program.
69
The Bagley Test, Strict Scrutiny, and the Rational Relation Test
The majority in Myers chose to apply the Bagley test rather than
160. 29 Cal. 3d at 273-74, 625 P.2d at 791-92, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 878-79.
161. Id at 281, 625 P.2d at 796-97, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 883-84.
162. Id at 286-90 & n.2, 625 P.2d at 799-802 & n.2, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 886-89 & n.2 (Bird,
C.J., concurring).
163. Id. at 290 n.2, 625 P.2d at 802 n.2, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 889 n.2.
164. Id
165. Id at 298, 625 P.2d at 807, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 894 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
166. Id (emphasis in original).
167. Id at 301, 625 P.2d at 809, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 896.
168. Id at 305, 625 P.2d at 811, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 898 (emphasis in original).
169. Id at 297, 625 P.2d at 807, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 894.
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the strict scrutiny or rational relation standard to the Budget Act re-
strictions. A comparison of the two standards demonstrates why Bag-
ley is a better method of analysis for determining the validity of
conditions placed on public benefit programs. Although Bagley and its
progeny are based on the California Constitution, a similar analysis
could be used to determine the constitutionality of conditions under the
United States Constitution.
The Bagley test borrows elements from both the rational relation
standard and the strict scrutiny standard. The first requirement of the
test-that the imposed condition relate to the purposes of the program
that confers the benefits-is merely a restatement of the federal rational
relation standard. 170 The third requirement--that no alternative less
offensive to constitutional rights be available to achieve the state's in-
terest-is a component of strict scrutiny.
17 1
The unique element of Bagley is the weighing and balancing re-
quirement of the second prong. 172 In performing this process, courts
must assess realistically the importance of the state interest served by
the restriction and the degree to which the restriction actually promotes
the interest. Courts then must evaluate carefully the importance of the
constitutional right at stake and gauge the extent to which the individ-
ual's ability to exercise that right is threatened or impaired. Weighing
all the factors, a court following Bagley must decide whether the state's
interest manifestly outweighs any resulting impairment of constitu-
tional rights.
173
This balancing process is absent from both the strict scrutiny and
the rational relation standards. Strict scrutiny demands that a statute
170. See, e.g., New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 302 (1976) ("[O]ur decisions...
require only that the. . . [statutes] challenged be rationally related to a legitimate state
interest."); see also Bogacki v. Board of Supervisors, 5 Cal. 3d 771, 796 & n.12, 489 P.2d 537,
555 & n.12, 97 Cal. Rptr. 657, 675 & n.12 (1971) (Tobriner, J., dissenting) ("IThe 'rational
relationship' standard which constitutes the sole 'due process' criterion, is only the first crite-
rion which a dismissal.. . based on an employee's exercise of a constitutional right must
satisfy [under Bagley].").
171. See Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 643 (1973) ("The means the state employs
[in seeking to define its political community] must be precisely drawn in light of the ac-
knowledged purpose"); see also Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers, 29
Cal. 3d at 282 n.28, 625 P.2d at 797 n.28, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 884 n.28 (noting that the third
component of Bagley parallels the requirement under strict scrutiny that the distinctions
drawn by the law in question are necessary to further the state's purpose).
172. The balancing process is not wholly unknown in federal cases analyzing conditions
on public benefit programs. See, e.g., United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n
of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973); Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971); Pickering v.
Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968). In these cases, however, the Court never articulated an
analytical framework. It did not indicate the factors to be considered, nor did it assign a
particular burden of proof.
173. Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d at 273-74, 625 P.2d
at 791-92, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 878-79.
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promote a compelling state interest; few statutes survive that stan-
dard. 174 In contrast, a statute will not be set aside under the rational
relation test if any set of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify
it.175 Frequently, when courts decide to use the rational relation test,
the statute is upheld.176
After Califano v. Jobst and Harris v. McRae, a federal court evalu-
ating conditions imposed on public benefit programs will apply the
strict scrutiny standard only if the condition directly and substantially
affects constitutional rights by placing a "legal obstacle" in the path of
those who choose to exercise their rights. 177 All other conditions must
be evaluated under the rational relation standard.178
The Bagley test is more flexible than either of the federal stan-
dards. Because of the balancing process in the second prong, results
under the test are not predetermined solely by the characterization of
the right at issue. The importance of individual rights is not determina-
tive under Bagley but rather is a factor weighed against the benefits
produced by the challenged conditions. 179 Although under current fed-
eral analysis a court also must characterize the nature of the impact
8 0
the challenged restriction has on individual rights, the Bagley test per-
mits courts to avoid making the difficult and often meaningless distinc-
tion between a direct and an indirect effect on fundamental rights. As
evidenced by the confusion in the McRae, Jobst, and Zablocki cases,
no clear test exists for determining whether or not a governmental reg-
ulation directly affects a fundamental right.18' The Bagley analysis al-
lows courts to decide the validity of conditions on a case-by-case
basis. 182
174. See, e.g., Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974); Loving v. Vir-
ginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); see also Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 363-64 (1972) (Burger,
C.J., dissenting) ("To challenge. . . [statutes] by the 'compelling state interest' standard is to
condemn them all. So far as I am aware, no state law has ever satisfied this seemingly
insurmountable standard, and I doubt one ever will, for it demands nothing less than
perfection.").
175. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961).
176. See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodri-
guez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
177. See notes 73-77, 91-92, 99 & accompanying text supra.
178. See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. at 324; Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47, 54-55
(1977).
179. See Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d at 273-74, 625
P.2d at 791-92, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 878-79.
180. See notes 70-80, 93-100 & accompanying text supra.
181. See notes 79-100 & accompanying text supra.
182. Because of the balancing process in the second prong, the Bagley test does not
produce a rule that will determine the outcome of a class of cases. Although the state does
bear the "heavy burden" of demonstrating "the practical necessity" for the condition at
issue, see Bagley v. Washington Township Hosp. Dist., 65 Cal. 2d at 505, 421 P.2d at
414, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 406, a court following Bagley can determine that a condition
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Although the weighing and balancing process in Bagley invites
subjective judicial determinations in decisions perhaps better left to the
legislature,183 this criticism is equally applicable to the current federal
analysis. Under that analysis, judges are forced to make a variety of
subjective determinations regarding whether a right is fundamental
and whether that right is directly and substantially burdened by a stat-
utory condition. The Bagley test is superior to the federal approach
because the second stage structures subjective judicial determinations
by directing courts to focus on the specific factors that separate permis-
sible conditions from impermissible conditions.
8 4
The strength of the Bagley test lies in the flexibility of the balanc-
ing process in the second prong. This flexibility, however, is dimin-
ished by the absolute nature of the third prong. Even if a statute
survives the balancing process, the third prong requires courts to strike
down statutes that could be drawn more narrowly. This requirement
means that Bagley, in its current form, may force courts to invalidate
beneficial legislation because another potentially less restrictive means
exists for obtaining the same objective. Although narrowly drawn laws
should be a legislative goal, perfection should not be required; a court
should not be allowed to invalidate a condition that meets the first two
requirements under Bagley solely because the court can conceive of a
more narrowly drawn statute. The third prong should be eliminated.
Instead, the possible existence of a less restrictive way to achieve the
same legislative end should be another factor balanced in the second
prong of the Bagley test to determine whether the statute should be
affecting the constitutional rights of benefit recipients is constitutional. See, e.g., Akin v.
Board of Educ., 262 Cal. App. 2d 161, 68 Cal. Rptr. 557 (1968). As a flexible test that directs
courts to consider a number of relevant factors in determining the validity of public benefit
conditions, the Bagley test corrects many of the shortcomings Justice Marshall recognized in
the federal two-tiered equal protection analysis. Criticizing the rigidity of the federal ap-
proach, Justice Marshall, dissenting in Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970), sug-
gested that cases involving the "literally vital interests of a powerless minority" should not
be subjected to the same reasoning used to evaluate the regulation of business interests. Id
at 520 (Marshall, J., dissenting). He advocated evaluation of statutory classifications that
withhold benefits from public aid recipients by balancing "the character of the classification
in question, the relative importance to individuals in the class discriminated against of the
governmental benefits that they do not receive and the asserted state interests in support of
the classification." Id at 521. The Bagley analysis, by gauging the practical effect of statu-
tory restrictions on recipients' rights and by realistically assessing the importance of the
state's interests, balances two of the three factors Justice Marshall considered important in
evaluating restrictions in public benefit programs. Committee to Defend Reproductive
Rights v. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d at 273, 625 P.2d at 791, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 878.
183. See 29 Cal. 3d at 305, 625 P.2d at 811-12, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 898-99 (Richardson, J.,
dissenting).
184. See id at 273-74, 625 P.2d at 791-92, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 878-79.
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upheld. 185
Conclusion
The Bagley test has guided California courts in analyzing uncon-
stitutional condition cases over the last fifteen years. In Myers, the
Supreme Court reaffirmed the importance of the Bagley test in Califor-
nia constitutional law. Because of the balancing process incorporated
in the second prong of the test, Bagley is a more flexible analytical tool
than the strict scrutiny or rational relation standard. Bagley directs
courts to consider a variety of factors when evaluating restrictions that
condition receipt of benefits on the loss of constitutional rights, and
provides a workable solution to the unconstitutional conditions
dilemma.
Nancy Lynn Walker*
185. See O'Neil, supra note I, at 478 (the existence of other alternative means should not
be the determinative factor, but rather one of many weighed).
* Member, Second Year Class.
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